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Conflict of laws involves problems conveniently grouped under the
headings of jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments. During the previ-
ous survey period major developments occurred nationally in al three ar-
eas. This year, however, the major developments involved Texas
jurisdiction cases and national and Texas developments in the area of
judgments.
I. JURISDICTION
4. Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Texas- Article 2031b
Under article 203 lb, 1 Texas' long-arm jurisdiction statute, a court must
answer a defendant's contest of jurisdiction by examining two distinct is-
sues: first, whether the statutory requirements have been met and sec-
ondly, whether assertion of jurisdiction exceeds constitutional limits. This
approach was discussed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Preean v. Sonatrach, Inc. 2
Plaintiffs' husbands were employees of a Dallas engineering firm which
entered into a contract with defendant Sonatrach, Inc. to provide technical
assistance for projects conducted in Algeria. While performing contractual
duties in Algeria, the husbands were killed in the crash of an airplane that
* A.B., J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., New York University; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, Baylor University.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982). Article 2031bprovides: Any foreign corporation, association, joint stock company, partnership, or
nonresident natural person that engages in business i this State, irrespective
.of any Statute or law respecting designation or maintenance of resident agents,
and does not maintain a place of regular business in this State or a designated
agent upon whom service may be made upon causes of action arising out of
such business done in this State, the act or acts of engaging in such business
within this State shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such for-
eign corporation, joint stock company, association, partnership, or non-resi-
dent natural person of the Secretary of State of Texas as agent upon whom
service of process may be made in any action, suit or proceedings arising out
of such business done in this State, wherein such corporation, joint stock com-
pany, association, partnership, or non-resident natural person is a party or is
to be made a party.
Id. § 3. Article 203 lb is only one of a number of devices a plaintiff may use to obtain
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See, e.g., id. art. 2039a (Vernon 1964) (long-arm
motorist statute). See also TEx. R. Civ. P. 108, which provides for service of notice of pend-
ing litigation on defendants not present within the state.
2 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Jim Fox Enterprises, Inc. v. Air France, 664
F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1981).
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was manufactured by defendant Beech Aircraft Corporation, owned by
defendant Air Algeria, and chartered by Sonatrach. All three defendants
were nonresidents of Texas. The plaintiffs filed wrongful death actions in
a federal district court in Texas, alleging personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendants by virtue of article 2031b. The district court dis-
missed the action against all three defendants for lack of personal
jurisdiction.3
The precise issue facing the court was whether article 2031b definition-
ally authorizes exercise of jurisdiction to constitutional limits. The court
noted that the literal language of the long-arm statute suggests that a nexus
must exist between a cause of action and a defendant's contacts with
Texas. 4 Thus, the court rejected plaintiffs contention that the Texas
Supreme Court, in U-Anchor Advertising v. Burt,5 interpreted article 203 lb
broadly, so as to reach all claims compatible with the limits of due process,
regardless of their relationship to a defendant's activities within the state. 6
The court, noting that Texas courts have recognized this nexus require-
ment,7 concluded that until such time as article 2031 b is amended by the
Texas Legislature, suits relying on 2031b must involve designated causes
of action that arise out of the defendant's contacts with Texas.8
The Prejean court then decided whether the three defendants were ame-
nable to process under the long-arm statute. The court held that Air Alge-
ria was not amenable to jurisdiction because the economic effect of an
alleged tortious act in Algeria with only fortuitous impacts on Texas survi-
vors was simply an insufficient basis on which to establish jurisdiction.9
Beech could not be sued in Texas because the cause of action did not arise
from Beech's activities in Texas and, therefore, did not meet the require-
ments of the Texas statute.' 0 Since the record as developed by the lower
court was inconclusive, the court reversed and remanded for further dis-
3. Id. at 1264.
4. Id. at 1265. See, e.g., TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 2 (Vernon 1964),
which restricts amenability to process to "any action . . . arising out of. . . business" in
Texas. (emphasis added)
5. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 197), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). The defendant in U-
Anchor was doing business in Texas as defined in article 203 lb. Amenability to suit was
denied, however, on constitutional grounds. The Texas Supreme Court noted that courts
need to "focus on the constitutional limitations of due process" in construing the reach of
article 2031b. 553 S.W.2d at 762.
6. 652 F.2d at 1265-66. In so holding, the court expressly disapproved the language in
Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1978), that indicated that a nexus was
not required. 652 F.2d at 1267.
7. 652 F.2d at 1266 n.8. The court noted that in some Texas cases the nexus require-
ment is recognized as having a purely statutory origin. Id See, e.g., Diversified Resources
Corp. v. Geodynamics Oil & Gas, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi
1977, writ ref d n.r.e.). Other cases could be interpreted as supporting a constitutional basis
for the nexus requirement. See, e.g., Computer Synergy Corp. v. Business Sys. Prods., Inc.,
582 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ). The vast majority
of Texas cases, however, simply require a nexus. See Prejean, 652 F.2d at 1266 n.8.
8. 652 F.2d at 1267.
9. Id. at 1269-70.
10. Id. at 1270.
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covery with regard to Sonatrach. "
It is not surprising that the Fifth Circuit concluded that article 2031b
authorizes exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only when
the suit involves a cause of action that arises out of a specific designated
contact with Texas. Constitutional developments at the time article 2031 b
was promulgated clearly supported exercises of jurisdiction only in such
cases. 12 Accordingly, the question that arose most frequently in the early
years of the operation of the statute was whether exercises of jurisdiction
under the statute were constitutional. More recently the Supreme Court of
'the United States has modified the substantive due process constraints on
exercise of jurisdiction. 13 Now the question is less likely to be whether a
clearly authorized exercise of jurisdiction is constitutional, but whether a
constitutional exercise of jurisdiction is authorized.
Several approaches might be followed in seeking a solution to this diffi-
culty. The obvious solution is to amend article 203 lb to make it clear that
it authorizes exercise of jurisdiction to the extent of constitutional limits. 14
This has not been done.15 Alternatively the problem could be addressed in
the rules of procedure as issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. This has
been done, 16 but the validity of this approach under terms of the Texas
Constitution has been sharply questioned. 17 Finally, article 2031b itself
could be interpreted as expansively as possible. This is the approach fol-
lowed by the Supreme Court of Texas in the recent case of Hall v. Helicop-
ters Nationales De Colombia, S.A. ("Helicol"). 1s
In the Hall case the plaintiffs were survivors of Americans who were
killed in a helicopter crash in Peru. The facts of the case revolve around a
contract between the Peruvian state owned oil company and an American
joint venture. The American joint venture agreed to construct a pipeline
from the jungles of Peru to the Pacific Ocean. The joint venture was com-
posed of three American corporations who had joined for the sole purpose
It. Id. at 1270-71.
12. See generally Wilson, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents." An Invitation
anda Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1957).
13. See generally Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), Shaffer
v. Heitner, 403 U.S. 186 (1977).
14. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1982).
15. While the general statute has not been so amended, some specific statutes have. For
instance, section 3.26 of the Family Code provides:
If the petitioner is a resident or domiciliary of this state at the commencement
of a suit for divorce, annulment, or to declare a marriage void, the court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent. . .although the respondent
is not a resident or a domiciliary of this state if. . .there is any basis consistent
with the constitution of this state or the United States for the exercise of the
personal jurisdiction.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
16. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 (Vernon 1982).
17. See Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 425, 435
(1979). See also Placid Investments, Ltd. v. Girard Trust Bank, 663 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir.
1981).
18. 25 Tex. S. Ct. J. 190 (1982).
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of performing the contract in Peru. Two of the three corporations were
Texas corporations. The third corporation had extensive contacts with
Texas, but these corporations, individually or in their joint venture status,
were not being sued. Rather it was another corporation, Helicol, which
had contracted with the joint venture to provide helicopter service in Peru.
Plaintiff Hall relied upon the following contacts: (1) a pre-contract visit of
a Helicol officer to Texas to discuss capacity to supply helicopter service,
(2) a purchase by Helicol over a period of six years of most of its equip-
ment and supplies from Bell Helicopter in Fort Worth, (3) payment to
Helicol by the joint venture with checks drawn on a Houston bank,
(4) training of Helicol's pilots and personnel in Texas and (5) Helicol's
agreement to carry insurance measured in United States dollars.' 9
Two questions arise: whether these facts satisfy article 2031b and
whether jurisdiction, if authorized, is consistent with the due process re-
quirements of the constitution.
The Court of Civil Appeals interpreted article 2031b as requiring a
showing that the defendant had either committed a tort in Texas or en-
tered into a contract to be performed in whole or in part in Texas. 20 The
Supreme Court of Texas disagreed and held that such an interpretation
improperly restricts the reach of the statute. Article 2031b provides:
For the purpose of this Act, and without including other acts that may
constitute doing business, any (foreign defendant) shall be deemed
doing business in this State by entering into a contract. . . to be per-
formed in whole or in part. . . in this State, or the committing of any
tort in whole or in part in this State.2'
The phrase "and without including other acts that may constitute doing
business" was labeled "catchall language" to be used to expand the scope
of article 2031b "to the full extent of jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
fendant whenever doing so is consistent with due process."' 22 As pointed
out by the court, this permits courts to avoid difficulties inherent in defin-
ing "doing business" and proceed to the important question of whether a
given exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process. Clearly the
court is correct in its description of the effect of this expansive use of the
catchall language and therefore this authoritative statement is welcome in-
deed. The statute as a whole, however, read in its historical context, was at
best ambiguous-it is certainly plausible to read it as requiring satisfaction
of the "tort" or "contract" elements. Indeed, in 1979 the Texas Legislature
amended article 2031 b to add "The Act of recruiting Texas residents, di-
rectly or through an intermediary located in Texas, for employment inside
19. Id. at 191.
20. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ.
App. -Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, af'd, 25 Tex. S. Ct. J. 190 (Feb. 24, 1982)).
21. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
22. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 191 (citing U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d
760, 762 (Tex. 1977); Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973,
writ ref d n.r.e.); Thode, In Personam Jurisdietion, Article 2031b, The Texas "Long-Arm' Ju-
risdiction Statute; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42
TEXAs L. REV. 279, 307-08 (1964)).
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or outside of Texas shall be deemed doing business in this State."' 23 To the
extent that the 1959 catchall language extends jurisdiction to constitutional
limits, this amendment was unnecessary. Such a state of affairs raises in-
teresting questions of statutory interpretation. 24
Those questions of statutory interpretation are of historical interest only.
But two other questions raised by the Hall case are of great prospective
interest. First, is the catchall language broad enough to extend jurisdiction
to the constitutional limits in every case? And second, can article 2031 b, as
interpreted, be used directly with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure?
The catchall language is "and without including other acts that may
constitute doing business. '25 This language is broader than the language
of either the "tort" or "contract" provisions. In any instance where ordi-
nary language usage would apply, statutory authorization exists. Rare oc-
casions may arise, however, where the specific "tort" or "contract"
provisions cannot be invoked and where the basis of the assertion of juris-
diction does not come within the ordinary meaning of doing business. For
instance, in the case of Taylor v. Texas Department of Public Welfare,26 a
paternity and child support case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
fathering of an illegitimate child was not a tortious act. No contract was
involved in that case. And no normal interpretation of "doing business"
would encompass the acts upon which jurisdiction was predicated. Be-
cause this type of case could arise, a statutory enactment clearly extending
the jurisdiction of Texas courts to the limits permitted by due process is
still necessary.
As written, article 203 lb provides that nonresidents who do business in
Texas must designate an agent for service of process. If no agent is desig-
nated then by law there is a conclusive presumption of designation of the
Secretary of State as agent for service of process. Service under 2031b
involves application of statutory provisions for service on the Secretary
who in turn "notifies" the defendant. 27 Where the statute authorizing ju-
risdiction does not include any specific method for service of citation 28 it is
clear that the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure may be used. But may a
plaintiff rely on the catchall language of 2031 b and turn to the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure instead of 2031 b for service of citation authorization?
While the Texas Supreme Court ultimately may authorize such a proce-
dure, a cautious attorney will be sure to use the service method of 2031b
when using its statutory authorization. A statutory authorization ex-
tending the jurisdiction of Texas courts to constitutional limits but not in-
23. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 2031b, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
24. If the 1959 language goes to constitutional limits then the unnecessary 1979 amend-
ment must mean either that the legislators did not understand their own law or they knew it
and nonetheless chose to add an unnecessary amendment to the statute. Normal rules of
interpretation are, of course, the reverse. When normal rules are applied, however, the
catchall language cannot be read to extend jurisdiction to constitutional limits.
25. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
26. 549 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
28. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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cluding a specific method of service of citation would permit use of the
Texas rules of procedure.
After determining that there was statutory authorization for exercise of
jurisdiction, the court in Hall turned its attention to a consideration of due
process mandates. After an altogether excellent discussion of due process
and the recent United States Supreme Court cases on the subject, the ma-
jority concluded that jurisdiction could not be constitutionally exercised in
this case.29
Other cases raised the central question of the constitutionality of juris-
dictional exercises during the survey period.30 Several of these cases in-
volved agency questions. In a per curiam opinion in Applied Polymers of
America v. Wright Waterproofing Co.31 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed agency in the context of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents. Long-arm jurisdiction had been successfully exercised by
virtue of petitioner, a foreign corporation, having a sales representative in
Texas.32 The court refused petitioner's application of writ of error 33 but
noted that the refusal was not "to be interpreted as approving the court of
civil appeals language (implying) that a sales representative is in every in-
stance the agent of an out-of-state defendant."' 34 Rather, where the evi-
dence so indicates, a sales representative may be an independent
contractor.35 In La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc. v. Schmelig Construction Co. 36
the question that arose was whether guaranteeing the construction contract
of a subsidiary subjected the parent corporation to jurisdiction in a Texas
court. The subsidiary corporation entered into contracts with La Quinta
Motor Inns to build motels in Tennessee, Nevada, Alabama, Texas, and
Florida. Schmelig, the parent corporation, guaranteed the performance of
the subsidiary only on the Florida project. The court held that the facts
that the parent had guaranteed the subsidiary's performance through the
mails and that payments would be made at the Texas domicile of the
payor were sufficient contacts with the forum for the proper exercise of
jurisdiction. 37 Agency responsibility in the case of corporations exists
when management and operations are assimilated to the extent that one is
simply a name or conduit through which the other conducts its business.
38
29. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 194.
30. See Read v. Cary, 615 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ reftd
n.r.e.) (due process not violated when defendant's contacts are neither minimal nor fortui-
tous and designed to result in personal ecnomic benefit). See also Castanho v. Jackson
Marine, Inc., 650 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1981); In re McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 647 F.2d 515
(5th Cir. 1981).
31. 608 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1980).
32. Applied Polymers of America v. Wright Waterproofing Co., 602 S.W.2d 67 (Tex.
Civ. App-Dallas 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
33. 608 S.W.2d at 165.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 617 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
37. Id. at 828.
38. See Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975). For another case
involving a guaranty agreement, see Marathon Metallic Bldg. Co. v. Mountain Empire Con-
str. Co., 653 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1981).
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It is not clear whether the court in the La Quinta case was applying the
agency test or simply holding that Schmelig itself conducted business in
Texas.
B. Special Appearance in Texas." Rule 120a Cases
In any case where the defendant asserts a lack of personal jurisdiction
the procedure for this assertion is critical. This is so because lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction is cured, and the right to claim lack of personal jurisdic-
tion is waived, by a "general" personal appearance under traditional law.
Of course this rule puts a nonresident defendant to a Hobson's choice: he
can participate in the trial and defend on the merits but waive lack of
personal jurisdiction or he can allow the suit to proceed to a default judg-
ment waiving any defense on the merits but perserving the question of lack
of jurisdiction. 39 The defendant in the 1890 Texas case of York v. State40
argued that this Hobson's choice was constitutionally unfair, but the
Surpeme Court disagreed.
Even though the constitution did not prohibit defendants being forced to
concede personal jurisdiction as a price of being heard on the merits,
Texas, like its sister states, chose not to force nonresident defendants to
elect between a defense on the merits and an assertion of lack of jurisdic-
tion. Texas adopted Rule 120a4' which permits a non-resident to make a
"special" appearance "for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person . . of the defendant, on the ground that such
party. . is not amenable to process issued by the courts of this state."'42
Under the rule and influence of York, only if a defendant carefully fol-
lowed Rule 120a could he avoid conferring jurisdiction since every appear-
ance, prior to judgment, not in strict compliance, is a general appearance.
Further defendants are required to plead and prove that they are not
'amenable" to process. Special appearances cannot be used to complain
about defective service or defective process. Any defendant who specially
appears by definition has notice of the suit and is before the court. Only if
a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction exists-a violation of the federal or
state constitution or a state statute-can a special appearance succeed.
Given these well-known rules, surely consent to jurisdiction, if proved in
the trial court, would defeat any 120a assertion by a defendant. Not so
said the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in the case of TM Productions, Inc.
v. Blue Mountain Broadcasting Co. 43 Plaintiff, a Texas corporation, con-
39. Of course the lack of jurisdiction is raised in defense to a claim that the default
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in a court clearly having jurisdiction over the
defendant.
40. 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
41. See Counts, More on Rule 120a 28 TEXAS B.J. (1965); Thode, supra note 22.
42. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
43. 623 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ granted). The writ of error was
granted with the notation "Granted on Point 1." Point of error one reads "The court of
appeals erred in holding that the failure of the plaintiff to allege defendant's consent to
jurisdiction in plaintiff's original petition relieved defendant of the burden under Rule
1982]
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tracted to make musical commercials for defendant, Blue Mountain
Broadcasting Company, an Idaho corporation with its principal place of
business in Oregon. The owner and general manager of Blue Mountain,
John H. Runkle, Jr., received TM promotional brochures, and called TM's
office in Dallas. Several months later, a TM sales representative visited the
Oregon office of Blue Mountain. Runkle and the sales representative
signed two written contracts licensing the use of TM's products for three
years. Pursuant to the contracts TM mailed products to Blue Mountain
and Blue Mountain made one payment by mail to Dallas on each contract.
Because problems developed in the execution of the contracts, TM sued
Blue Mountain asserting jurisdiction under article 203 lb. During the 120a
hearing, Blue Mountain placed in evidence John Runkle's deposition with
the two contracts attached as exhibits. Apparently the trial court consid-
ered contacts between Blue Mountain and Texas and did not consider the
contracts, although they were in evidence. Clearly, TM pled only contacts
and not the contractual agreement. The trial court judge dismissed the
suit.44 According to the court of appeals, "[o]n this appeal, plaintiff [TM]
contends that defendant [Blue Mountain] failed to establish its lack of
amenability to process because one of the contracts in question contains an
express consent to suit in Texas courts. Defendant replies that plaintiff
cannot now assert jurisdiction of defendant's person on the basis of such
consent because it did not plead consent as a ground of jurisdiction and
did not otherwise raise the ground in the trial court. We agree."
'45
Any understanding of the conclusion of the majority in this case must
start with the Texas Supreme Court case of McKanna v. Edgar.46 In Mc-
Kanna the supreme court held that in a direct appeal from a default judg-
ment a lack of jurisdiction apparent on the face of the record will vitiate
the trial court's judgment. Cited as support for this rule are the cases of
Flynt v. City of Kingsville,47 Texaco Inc. v. McEwen,4s and Doak v. Biggs.49
These cases, and the cases upon which they rely,50 recognize that a judg-
ment rendered against a defendant without citation or service and without
any appearance is a nullity. Nonetheless in a case where a judgment is
rendered without citation and service in fact, but recites that service was
had, no collateral attack on the judgment or its verity is permitted. Adop-
tion of this rule is premised on the sanctity and finality of court degrees, a
matter of general public policy. All attacks on such final judgments must
be made by some type of direct action (bill of review or appeal) challeng-
ing the judgment's validity. No presumption of validity, though, attaches
120(a) to demonstrate that it was not amenable to the process of Texas courts." 25 Tex. S.
Ct. J. 272 (Apr. 21, 1982).
44. See 623 S.W.2d at 428.
45. Id. at 429.
46. 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965).
47. 125 Tex. 510, 82 S.W.2d 934 (1935).
48. 356 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. 235 S.W. 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1921, no writ).
50. Particularly important is the case of State Mortgage v. Traylor, 120 Tex. 148, 36
S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1931).
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in cases where (1) there is a direct attack (no final judgment) and (2) where
there was a default judgment whose own recitations disclose a lack of ju-
risdiction. No explanation of these cases, their rationale or any other ra-
tionale for the rule of McKanna is set forth in McKanna. The opinion did
add, however, that "it is imperative and essential that the record affirma-
tively show a strict compliance with the provided mode of service,"' 5' that
no presumptions in favor of jurisdictions apply in direct appeals, 52 that a
failure of sufficient allegations cannot be overcome by a return not show-
ing facts which should have been alleged, 53 and that the defendant "is pre-
sumed to have entered [an] appearance to the term of the court at which
the mandate shall be filed." 54
Crystalization of the rule to be applied in direct attacks on default judg-
ments came in the case of hitney v. L & L Realty Corporation,55 a 1973
supreme court decision. 56 That case held that the record must affirma-
tively meet two major requirements "(1) [t]he pleadings must allege facts
which, if true, would make the defendant responsible to answer,--or in the
language of Rule 120a, contain allegations making the defendant 'amena-
ble to process' by the use of the long-arm statute; and (2) there must be
proof in the record that the defendant was, in fact, served in the manner
required by statute. ' 57 The requirement that proof be in the record that
the defendant in fact be served as required is based on the court's com-
mendable and constitutionally required concern for satisfaction of proce-
dural due process: a "defendant ought not to be cast in personal judgment
without notice." s58 Because of the constitutional nature of the procedural
due process notice requirement, a judgment which fails to meet the stan-
dard is subject to collateral attack. This is not a completely acceptable
remedy, however. As the opinion points out, collateral attack by bill of
review in Texas does not allow a defendant to present his defenses unless
he can first show that he had a good defense and that he was free from
fault in failing to appear. 59 Therefore, requiring a plaintiff to obtain a
51. 388 S.W.2d at 929 (citing Roberts v. Stockslager, 4 Tex. 307 (1849); Texaco v.
McEwen 356 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ refd n.r.e.) and Parker v.
Scobee, 36 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931 no writ)).
52. 388 S.W.2d at 929. The court cited Flynt v. City of Kingsville, 125 Tex. 510, 82
S.W.2d 934 (1935) and rejected the implications in Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 150 Tex. 398,
241 S.W.2d 142 (1951); Steele v. Caldwell, 158 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942,
no writ); Walker v. Koger, 99 S.W.2d 1034 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1936, writ dism'd);
Parker v. Scobee, 36 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, no writ); National Cereal Co.
v. Earnest, 87 S.W.2d 734, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1905, no writ).
53. 388 S.W.2d at 930 (distinguishing Employer's Reinsurance Corp. v. Brock, 74
S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934, writ dism'd.)).
54. 388 S.W.2d at 930 (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 123 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
55. 500 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973).
56. The opinions in McKanna and Whitney were both written by Chief Justice
Greenhill.
57. 500 S.W.2d at 95-96.
58. Id. at 97 (citing Roberts v. Stockslager, 4 Tex. 307 (1849) and McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90 (1917)).
59. 500 S.W.2d at 96 (citing Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1964) and Alexander
v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950)).
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certificate from the office of the Secretary of State, available for a trivial
fee, is a reasonable requirement.
While the supreme court cases of McKanna and Whitney do not belabor
the basis for their conclusions, it is uncontestable that the rule announced
in those cases applies to direct attacks from default judgments. Examina-
tion of the rationale set forth in those two cases, and the cases cited, dis-
closes a sound approach. When the issue of jurisdiction is not litigated
(default judgment), then the record ought to at least disclose jurisdiction.
That requires that the plaintiff plead facts which, if proved, would estab-
lish jurisdiction under appropriate statutory and constitutional restraints.
Further, proof on the record that a proper means was used to notify the
defendant is a guarantee against unnecessary and improper default judg-
ments. Only where defendants have notice can they be expected to come
forward to contest jurisdiction in the proper case.
As the Dallas court of appeals noted in TM Productions, though, deci-
sions by the court of civil appeals applying McKanna and Whitney have
ignored the triggering requirements of those cases and applied their rule in
ways which do not serve the rule's underlying rationale. Starting with the
case of Castle v. Berg60 in 1967, at least five of our courts of civil appeals
have applied the rule to non-default cases.61 This application does not
simply go beyond the holdings of the supreme court, it contradicts them.
One of the bases for the McKanna and Whitney rule is that the issue of
jurisdiction had not been litigated and therefore a failure to properly in-
voke jurisdiction by pleading could require reversal. Application of the
McKanna and Whitney exception to a case where jurisdiction was actually
litigated amounts to a negation of the very general rule to which McKanna
and Whitney form an exception. McKanna and Whitney start with a rec-
ognition that res judicata applies to jurisdictional issues; the decisions of
the court of civil appeals functionally reject that recognition by misapply-
ing the rule. The only basis offered is that the plaintiff did not properly
plead jurisdictional facts. Such a narrow holding is inconsistent with gen-
eral rules of notice pleading. Indeed if the approach of the courts of ap-
peals were applied to pleading generally we would return to the
thoroughly discounted English writ approach where a failure to dot an "i"
or cross a "' was fatal. Not even the legacy of York v. State62 can justify
this result because in 1976 rule 120a was changed to allow defendants to
60. 415 S.W. 2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ). The case of TM Produc-
tions first appeared at 620 S.W.2d 886. However, on the court's motion that opinion was
withdrawn and the opinion at 623 S.W.2d 427 was substituted. The only change was that
the new opinion omits any citation to Castle and substitutes in its place the case of Gathers
v. Walpace, 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
61. Menchaca v. Chrysler Life Insurance Co., 604 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1980, no writ; Mills v. Stinger Boats, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1979, writ retd n.r.e.); Gathers v. Walpace Co., Inc., 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Burges v. Ancillary Acceptance Corp., 543 S.W.2d 738
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
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amend a special appearance "to cure defects."' 63 Further, McKanna and
Whitney are cases where failure of notice to the defendant was a major
factor. This cannot be a factor in non-default cases since the defendant
appeared and participated. Finally, under McKanna and Whitney the
remedy was a reversal, not a dismissal. In the Castle case the court held
that the defendant was entitled to a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.64
Not only are these decisions by the courts of civil appeals unjustified,
where a dismissal occurs a plaintiff may lose a cause of action due to the
statute of limitations. In such a case the error would be more than simple
inconvenience and cost.
In TM Productions the Dallas court of appeals recognized the gap be-
tween the supreme court holdings and the decisions of the courts of ap-
peals. There is no indication, however, of any recognition of the
propensity of these decisions to actually undercut the supreme court cases.
The majority, therefore, decided to side with the "uniform interpretation
of rule 120a by the courts of civil appeals" 65 so as not to introduce uncer-
tainty and confusion into an area where they are important considerations.
Judge Akin is correct in his dissent; the choice is between supreme court
authority and that of courts of civil appeals. 66 If that fact alone is not
enough, then certainly the fact that the courts of appeals decisions are
wrong ought to count for something. 67
The real problem, however, goes beyond the misinterpretation of Rule
120a. It is that Rule 120a responds to York v. State and that case is of
doubtful current validity. The main teaching of Shaffer v. Heitner68 is that
the territoriality doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff69 no longer applies. York
dealt with the fairness of forcing someone to appear (automatically grant-
ing territorial jurisdiction) and fight on the merits, or stay away (denying
territorial jurisdiction) and lose on the merits but preserve the jurisdic-
tional question. A good argument can be made that this was "unfair" even
if one accepts the territoriality concept of jurisdiction. Under the Shaffer
test, though, surely a defendant cannot "fairly" be forced to submit to ju-
63. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
64. 415 S.W.2d at 526.
65. 623 S.W.2d at 432.
66. Id. at 435. In the following additional cases handed down during the Survey period,
courts of appeals have applied McKanna and Whitney properly in direct appeals of default
judgments: Devine v. Duree, 616 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ
granted); Helfman Motors, Inc. v. Stockman, 616 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1981, writ refd n.r.e.); Zaragoza v. De La Paz Morales, 616 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Inspection Services, Inc. v. Melville, 616 S.W.2d 253
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1981, no writ), Waldron v. Waldron, 614 S.W.2d 648
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ); Stylemark Constr., Inc. v. Spies, 612 S.W.2d 654
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Gerland's Food Fair, Inc. v. Hare, 611
S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Thomas Petroleum
Prod., Inc. v. Rulon Elec. Co., 609 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980,
no writ); Grasz v. Grasz, 608 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Mega v.
Anglo Iron & Metal Co., 601 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
67. 623 S.W.2d at 434.
68. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
69. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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risdiction to defend on the merits. Clearly, once the issue of jurisdiction is
joined the defendant ought to proceed by direct attack. Use of Rule 123,
as in McKanna, raises serious constitutional problems. What if McKanna
had not been sent notice and knew nothing of the suit? Then let us assume
that McKanna heard of the default judgment in time to directly appeal.
Can a direct appeal cost McKanna the right to contest constitutional ame-
nability? If so plaintiffs would all be able to obtain jurisdiction in all cases
where defendants appealed from default judgments by simply not serving
notice. Such a result is not in keeping with Shaffer. Our rules of appear-
ance to contest personal jurisdiction should be re-examined in the light of
recent developments. 70
II. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Tort Cases
In diversity cases a federal court must apply the laws of the state in
which it sits,7 ' including statutes of limitations72 and choice of law rules.73
Thus, although federal rules govern the manner in which process is
served, 74 state rules determine when a suit is commenced for purposes of
tolling state statutes of limitations. 75 These rules usually cause no diffi-
culty in ordinary cases, but are difficult to apply in transfer cases.
Transfers in federal courts are governed by two statutes: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) provides that a transfer may be made for the convenience of the
parties or in the interest of justice;76 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) authorizes trans-
fer when venue initially is improper. 77 In Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman the
United States Supreme Court held that section 1406(a) transfers are not
limited to cases in which the transferor court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. 78 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit permits transfer to a dis-
trict court when personal jurisdiction can be obtained under both sections
1404(a) and 1406(a). 79
A transferee court initially must consider which state's choice of law
rules should be applied to the case. Under the Supreme Court's holding in
Van Dusen v. Barrack, when a suit is properly filed in one district court but
is then transferred on the motion of the defendant to another court in a
different state, the transferee court is bound to apply the law of the state of
70. For an interesting case involving discovery of jurisdictional facts and the applicabil-
ity of McKanna in a federal diversity case, see Familia De Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A.,
629 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1980).
71. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
72. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
73. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
74. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965).
75. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 746 (1980).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
77. Id. § 1406(a).
78. 369 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1962).
79. Agucate Consol. Mines, Inc. v. Deeprock, Inc., 566 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978); see
Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1967) (transfer authorized under
§ 1406(a) when venue incorrect, personal jurisdiction is lacking, or both).
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the transferor court.80 No such clear guidance is available, however, when
(1) transfers are effected under section 1406(a), (2) under section 1404(a)
when the transferor court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, or
(3) under section 1404(a) on the motion of the plaintiff. The choice of law
issues presented by these three situations were addressed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp. 81
The plaintiff's wife in Ellis suffered a fall while disembarking from a
ride in an amusement park located in Texas. The fall caused a brain in-
jury which ultimately led to her death. Plaintiff, an Arkansas resident,
filed a suit in survival and wrongful death in a United States district court
in Arkansas in 1978, one day before the passage of two years from the date
of the accident. In 1979, in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff moved that the case be trans-
ferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Fort Worth Division, where venue lay. The trial court granted the
plaintiffs transfer motion, although the motion did not specify whether the
transfer was to be under section 1404(a) or section 1406(a), nor did the
motion allege that venue was improper in Arkansas or that the conven-
ience of the parties or the interests of justice would be served by a transfer
to Texas.82 After transfer was completed, and process served, the defend-
ants moved for summary judgment, alleging that because they had not
been served at the time the suit was pending in the Arkansas court, the suit
was barred under either the Texas two-year statute of limitations for ac-
tions in tort or under the comparable three-year limitations statute in Ar-
kansas.83 Summary judgment was granted and the plaintiff appealed.84
Because no grounds were given for the transfer motion, the court of ap-
peals considered the effect upon choice of law principles of transfers under
both sections. The court reasoned that if the transfer had been under sec-
tion 1406(a), the law of the state of the transferee court should apply.8 5
Otherwise, plaintiff could benefit from having brought the original action
in an impermissible forum.86 In contrast, under section 1404(a) transfers
from a district in which personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained, the trans-
feree court must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sitS.87
The court cited Professor Moore as explaining the policy behind its deci-
sion: "'In such a situation plaintiff could not maintain his action in the
district in which he filed. . . .Therefore he should not be permitted to file
his action there for the purpose of capturing the law of that jurisdiction for
80. 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); see cases cited in Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646
F.2d 1099, 1108 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. 646 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981).
82. The parties and transferee court characterized the transfer as having been pursuant
to § 1406(a). Id. at 1102.
83. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-
907 (Supp. 1981).
84. 646 F.2d at 1102.
85. Id. at 1109-10 (citing Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980)).
86. 646 F.2d at 1109.
87. Id. at 1109-10.
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transportation to the jurisdiction in which service can be obtained.' ",88
The court concluded that whether the transfer in Ellis was under section
1406(a) or section 1404(a), the law of Texas must be applied, since it was
undisputed that Arkansas, the transferor court, was unable to obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction over any of the defendants. 89
The Fifth Circuit predicted that courts sitting in Texas would apply
Texas law to determine the relative rights of the parties.90 Recognizing
that Texas has explicitly adopted the "most significant relationship test" of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,9 1 the court considered such
factors as where the conduct that give rise to the injury occurred, where the
business relationship of the parties was centered, the place of defendants'
business, and the contrasting lack of contacts with Arkansas. 92 The court
then proceeded to examine Texas statutes and decisions to determine
whether the plaintiffs claim was barred under the Texas statute of limita-
tions for actions in tort. 93 The court noted that under Texas law, the filing
of a suit will toll the running of the statute only when diligence is used in
procuring the issuance and service of citation. 94 In the absence of specific
state law involving transferred actions under federal law, however, the
court remanded the action for determination of whether diligence had
been exercised in this case.95
National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee96 is a more traditional federal
diversity case involving choice of law in tort. The original plaintiff was
Heloise Bowles, the author of a nationally syndicated column. She sued
Shaklee in a federal district court in Texas, alleging invasion of privacy,
misappropriation of her name and likeness, copyright infringement, trade-
mark violation, and unfair competition, all stemming from the alleged ille-
gal publication of her book. Although plaintiff lived in Texas, negotiations
for publication and distribution of the book, which were never completed,
took place primarily in California. Plaintiff died after the suit was filed
and the executor of her estate, National Bank of Commerce, was substi-
tuted as a party plaintiff.
Because the defendant was a California corporation and much of the
contact between Shaklee and Bowles took place there, the defendant ar-
gued that California law should apply. The plaintiff argued that Texas law
88. Id. at 1108 (quoting I J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.145[4.-5], at 1608-09 (2d ed. 1982). The court noted that
a contrary rule may be constitutionally proscribed. 646 F.2d at 1110. The possibility of a
change of law, however, may not defeat a transfer under a claim of forum non conveniens.
89. 646 F.2dat 1111.
90. Id. at 1112.
91. Id. at 11 1. The Texas Supreme Court adopted the most significant relationship test
in Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979) and reaffirmed the adoption in Robert-
son v. Estate of McKnight, 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
92. 646 F.2d at 1112.
93. Id. at 1112-15.
94. Id. at 1112.
95. Id. at 1114-15.
96. 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
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should apply because Bowles was domiciled in Texas at her death. The
choice of law issue was significant because under California law, the plain-
tiffs claim for damages for pain and suffering, and possibly those claims
for damages stemming from invasion of privacy and misappropriation,
would abate upon Bowles's death, whereas Texas law specifically provides
for the survival of pain and suffering claims upon death of the plaintiff.97
The court noted that section 167 of' the Restatement controls the
survivability of tort actions and utilizes the "most significant relationship"
test under section 145 in making this determination. Under section 145,
one of the contacts to be considered is the domicile of the parties. 98 The
comments dealing with domicile stress the use of domicile when the cause
of action is a personal one, as opposed to a business related claim;99 the
use of domicile is especially important when the injury occurs in two or
more states through multistate publication. 1°° The Restatement further
provides, in section 153, titled "multistate invasion of privacy," that the
plaintiff's rights for invasion of privacy arise from local law of the state
with the most significant relation, usually the plaintiffs domicile, if the
material was published in that state. 101
Under the Restatement guidelines, the court held that Texas law should
govern. 10 2 Plaintiff was both domiciled and doing business in Texas at the
time of the alleged wrongful acts. Moreover, defendant was a California
corporation selling products in every state in the United States. Their un-
authorized distribution of the plaintiffs book was nationwide, damaging
plaintiff in every state. The court, therefore, held that when a multistate
invasion of privacy occurs and the plaintiff files in the state of domicile,
then absent unusual factors not present in this case the law of the domicile
is the law of the state with the "most significant relationship."'' 0 3
One result of the adoption by the Texas Supreme Court of the most
significant relationship test of the Restatement in Gutierrez v. Collins 10 4 was
that any case not decided prior to July 11, 1979, the date of that decision,
was immediately controlled by the Restatement guidelines. 05 The new
rule would not be controlling, however, in wrongful death actions, because
choice of law in those actions is determined by statute.10 6 Causes in
wrongful death arising before the effective date of the 1975 version of arti-
cle 4678,107 the Texas "Death in a Foreign State" statute, are still con-
97. Id. at 538. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (Vernon 1958). Texas law was
unclear whether the invasion of privacy and misappropriation claims would survive. 503 F.
Supp. at 539.
98. 503 F. Supp at 539; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 167.
99. RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 145.
100. Id. comment e.
101. Id. § 153.
102. 646 F.2d at 539.
103. Id.
104. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979). See note 91 supra.
105. See Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 385, 397-
407 (1980).
106. See id.
107. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (providing that cause of
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trolled by the old statutory terms.'0 8 Because article 4678 is a substantive
rule, any change in its terms will not be given retroactive effect. 109
Under the unamended version of article 4678, lex loci delecti was appli-
cable for the determination of choice of law. 0 Traditional formulations
of lex loci hold that tort questions are governed by the law of the place of
harmful impact, the "place" of the tort. Indeed, the legislative adoption of
lex loci in wrongful death cases prevented judicial adoption of the Restate-
ment guidelines."' The holding in Cox v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. , 2
therefore, is somewhat of a surprise.
Mrs. Sharon Cox, the widow of Air Force Captain John T. Cox, brought
suit in wrongful death on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor chil-
dren. Captain Cox died in January of 1970 when his RF-4C aircraft
crashed near Mountain Home, Idaho. Suit was filed in 1978 in the United
States District Court in Austin charging McDonnell-Douglas with defects
in the design and manufacture of both the angle of attack system and the
ejection system. The allegedly defective airplane was manufactured in
Missouri. McDonnell-Douglas moved for summary judgment on the
ground that any cause of action was barred by the applicable statute of
limitation." 3 The question of whether the suit was barred by limitations
required an identification of the state whose choice of law rules would gov-
ern."14 Unamended article 4678 addressed this issue and provided that the
applicable law was that of the state where the "wrongful act, neglect or
default" occurred." 5 The court stated that apparently "no Texas Court
has faced choosing between the place of the negligent act and the place of
the injury in a wrongful death case."' " 6 To help determine the legislative
intent underlying article 4678, the court turned to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Richards v. United States." 7
In Richards the Supreme Court was called on to interpret section
action of death or injury of Texas resident occurring in a foreign state or country may be
brought in Texas courts under Texas substantive (including limitations) law).
108. Id. (Vernon 1952) (amended 1975) (providing that the law of the forum in which
death or injury occurred will control cause of action).
109. A retrospective application would be in violation of the Texas Constitution. See
TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 6. See also Penry v. Win. Barr, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 126, 128 (E.D. Tex.
1976); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 317 n.3 (Tex. 1979).
110. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
111. See Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 475 S.W.2d 715, 716 (Tex. 1972).
112. 503 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
113. Id. at 203.
114. Id.
115. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon 1952) (amended 1975).
116. 503 F. Supp. at 203. The court distinguished several Texas Supreme Court cases
holding to the contrary on the ground that in each, the negligent act and injury occurred in
the same state. Id; see Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc. 475 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 1972); Francis v.
Herrin Transp. Co., 432 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1968); Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430
S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968). Additionally, the court cited, but did not follow, Klaxon v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (conflict of law rules determined by law of forum in
diversity cases). 503 F. Supp. at 203.
117. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
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1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act."t 8 The Act codifies the traditional
lex loci rule by providing that jurisdiction lay where a private person
"would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
were the act or omission occurred."'' 9 The Court interpreted this section
to mean that appropriate law is chosen by considering the "whole law,"
including choice of law rules, of the state where the act or omission oc-
curred.' 20 One commentator has stated that the Court adopted a strained
construction of the Act to avoid the harsh result created by the drafting of
the choice of law rule. 12
1
Assuming that the Cox court's conclusion that Richards is valid evi-
dence of the Texas legislature's intent, the application of the Richards in-
terpretation was improper. The court looked to the law of Missouri, the
site of the alleged negligent acts, without looking at the "whole law."'
22
Apparently, the court did not consider Missouri's choice of law rules.
Richards is supportable only as a device to avoid harsh results under the
traditional lex loci rule. In this instance, though, the harsh result was not
avoided because Missouri law also adheres to the lex loci doctrine.'
23
B. Contracts
Traditional choice of law principles, applicable to agreements not to
compete, provide that "one law is applied to what is regarded as the initia-
tion of a contract and another to what is regarded as its final perform-
ance."'124 In Texas this rule has been followed since its adoption in
1885.125 Thus, when choice of law questions arose in the enforcement in
Texas of a "non-compete contract" signed in Illinois in Matlock v. Data
Processing Security, Inc. the answer was predictable: Texas law applied to
determine performance.' 2 6 Data Processing sought and obtained tempo-
rary injunctive relief against Matlock and other former employees, pursu-
ant to provisions in non-compete contracts signed by the defendants. Two
of the three former employees signed their contracts in Illinois, the former
domicile of Data Processing. Proof was offered that under Illinois law the
broad contract provisions against competition in the entire United States
rendered the contracts wholly void.' 27 The Fort Worth court of appeals
held that even if that were the law of Illinois, where the contract was exe-
118. The Federal Tort Claims Act is codified in scattered sections of title 28 of the
United States Code. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
120. 369 U.S. at 11.
121. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 101 (3d ed. 1977).
122. 503 F. Supp. at 204-05.
123. Id. at 205.
124. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 332 (1934). The rule was not changed
when the Restatement was reformulated, See RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 196.
125. See W.A. Ryan & Co. v. M.K. & T. Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 13 (1885); Mamlin v. Susan
Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ).
126. 607 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980), modpied, 618 S.W.2d 327
(Tex. 1981).
127. 607 S.W.2d at 948.
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cuted, it would not necessarily control.128 The court reached this conclu-
sion based on the fact that if the place of performance was Texas then the
intention of the parties must have been to choose the law of the forum
which would uphold the contract.1 29 Under Texas law such a contractual
provision was not void but merely unenforceable to the extent found un-
necessary for the protection of the former employer. 130 The law of Texas,
therefore, was applied,' 3' demonstrating once again the flexibility of
choice of law rules in contract.
A more unusual choice of law question was confronted in the case of
First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land Co. 132 K-F Land Company
secured a loan from plaintiff First Commerce, and offered land situated in
Houston as collateral for the loan. The loan note provided that it "shall be
governed by, interpreted and construed in accordance with the laws of the
State of Louisiana."' 133 Payment was to be made in New Orleans or such
other place in Louisiana as the holder might designate. A deed of trust on
the Texas land provided that the loan secured thereby was a Louisiana
transaction. The deed of trust, the note, and the related loan documents
were executed and delivered in the State of Louisiana and were to be gov-
erned in accordance with the laws of the State of Louisiana. A guaranty,
also securing the note, contained a similar provision. K-F subsequently
defaulted on the note. First Commerce foreclosed on the land in Texas
and, after the sale, a $572,761.85 deficiency remained. First Commerce
sought a deficiency judgment, but K-F argued that such a suit was barred
by the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act. 134 Somewhat surprisingly, the
court agreed with K-F.
Real property questions are almost always determined by the law of the
forum in which the land is situated. 35 In contrast, legal questions arising
from a contract are controlled by the parties' choice of law when the cho-
sen law bears a reasonable relationship to the contract and no other fo-
rum's public policy demands otherwise. 136 The question in First
Commerce was whether the claim for a deficiency judgment arose out of a
Texas real estate foreclosure and was controlled by Texas law or whether it
arose out of enforcement of the underlying debt and was controlled con-
tractually by Louisiana law. 137 After conceding the closeness of the ques-
tion, the court adopted the latter view because the parties clearly bargained
128. Id.
129. Id. at 948-49.
130. Id. at 950.
131. Id. at 948.
132. 617 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
133. Id. at 807.
134. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 2771-2772 (West 1961); LA REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:4106-4107 (West 1968).
135. 617 S.W.2d at 808 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 229).
136. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Vernon Supp. 1982). See also Teas v. Kim-
ball, 257 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1958); Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Fire Union Ins. Co., 432
S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1968); RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, §§ 186-188.
137. 617 S.W.2d at 809.
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for application of Louisiana law. 138 The court saw "no reason to frustrate
an intention so clearly expressed." 1
39
If the court's formulation of the issue is correct, then there certainly are
strong arguments for control by Texas law. As First Commerce indicated,
the deed of trust provisions are peculiar to Texas law and track the lan-
guage of the Texas statute for procedures for sale. Authorities in Texas,
Louisiana, and elsewhere uniformly agree that the methods of foreclosure
on land and the resulting interest determinations are governed by the law
of the situs state. 140 The clear purpose, and therefore the application, of
the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act, relates to methods of foreclosure
on Louisiana land. 14 1 If the suit on the underlying debt had first been
brought in Louisiana, as it clearly could have been, the court would then
have granted a deficiency judgment because the foreclosure had been on
Texas land. 142 That judgment would have been entitled to full faith and
credit in Texas. Because the suit was first brought in Texas, therefore,
Louisiana law should not dictate a different result.
Further, the court's argument, if examined closely, reveals the fallacy of
its conclusion. The court noted that because the parties had bargained for
the application of Louisiana law, it was reluctant to frustrate their inten-
tion by applying Texas law. 143 If the documents are read in the light of the
realities of the business world, however, the only clear intention of the
parties is that Louisiana law was to apply to the note and non-land guar-
antees and that transactions dealing with the land itself should be con-
trolled by Texas law. Any other interpretation not only ignores business
reality but would have the drafting party, First Commerce, contract away
its own right to a deficiency judgment. This result occurs because the
terms of the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act can never be satisfied in a
foreclosure of Texas real estate. 144
A Texas statute authorizes a penalty against individuals who collect a
real estate commission for the sale of land in Texas but who do not have a
Texas real estate broker's license. 145 In Smith v. Bidwel1146 the court con-
sidered whether this statute should be applied to a private dispute involv-
ing the sale of Texas land brokered by a Missouri resident. The defendant
had falsely represented to the plaintiff that he and an associate were li-
censed to sell Texas real estate. The negotiations and contract to sell the
land to a California couple were executed in Texas at the direction of the
defendant. The Corpus Christi court of civil appeals held that because the
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 229; G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS §§ 348-349 (3d ed. 1963).
141. See Gelpi v. Burke, 364 So. 2d 1064 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
142. Louisiana and most states with anti-deficiency statutes do not give them extraterri-
torial application. See Annot., 136 A.L.R. 1057 (1942).
143. 617 S.W.2d at 809.
144. The court recognized this argument but did not address it. See id.
145. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 19(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
146. 619 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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critical elements of the transaction occurred in Texas, the laws of Texas
should apply. 147
C Proof of Law
Professor Thomas has described Texas law pertaining to proof of for-
eign law as being "confused, incomplete, and in some instances behind the
times." 148 His entreaties to both the judiciary and the bar have not always
borne fruit. Consequently, proof of foreign law continues to be the morass
it was described as being a decade ago.
One of the cases in this "confusing" area is Franklin v. Smallridge.1
49
Franklin involved an action by a putative wife to set aside a deed to com-
munity property from the plaintiff's deceased "husband" to Smallridge on
the grounds that she had not joined in the transaction.'50 In order to pre-
vail, the plaintiff had to prove that she was married to the grantor, her
purported husband. In an attempt to prove her legal capacity to marry,
the plaintiff, on oral motion, requested the court to take judicial notice of
the laws of Mexico. The motion was supported only by the deposition of a
Mexican attorney. The trial court held that the plaintiff did not have the
requisite capacity to enter into a common law marriage. On appeal, the
court held that the deposition was insufficient to prove foreign law and,
consequently, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 151 The court rea-
soned that failing a proper showing of Mexican law, the Texas rule that a
foreign law is presumed to be the same as the law of the forum should be
followed. 152
In N.K. Parrish, Inc. v. Southwest Beef Industries Corp. 153 a dispute
arose over an agency agreement for the purchase of grain. The agreement
in question provided that it was "to be deemed executed under and to be
construed and governed by the laws of the State of Arizona."1 54 Since this
was a diversity case, the federal court applied Texas law, which recognizes
the right of parties to choose governing law so long as the choice is reason-
able.' 55 Although it appeared that the choice of Arizona law was not un-
reasonable, Arizona law was rejected because neither party raised or
briefed this issue on appeal.' 56 Thus, proof of law, whether previously
agreed to or not, cannot be ignored in the trial of Texas cases.
147. Id. at 449.
148. Thomas, Proof of Foreign Law in Texas, 25 Sw. L.J. 554, 570 (1971).
149. 616 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
150. The suit was originally filed as a divorce action and included the claim against
Smallridge. When the husband died, the divorce claim was dismissed, and the court pro-
ceeded to try the title claim alone.
151. Id. at 657-58.
152. Id.
153. 638 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1981).
154. Id. at 1370 n.3.
155. Id.; see Dowling v. NADW Marketing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Securities Inv. Co. v. Finance Acceptance Corp., 474
S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ refd n.r.c.).




Recently there has been a significant increase in the amount and com-
plexity of personal contact and trade between states in the United States
and between the United States and other nations. This phenomenon has
been accompanied by an increase in litigation. Largely due to these devel-
opments, the general question of the meaning and effect of judgments has
become increasingly important. After the first suit is over may the losing
party sue the winning party again on a related matter? What is a related
matter as opposed to a judicially determined matter? These and many
related questions are arising frequently both because the litigation is more
complex and because a litigious society is often willing to at least try an-
other suit. Two decisions by the Supreme Court and the adoption of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments signal the current direction of develop-
ment as to the meaning of judgments. 157
Once a determination is made on what a judgment means the problem
of actual enforcement still remains. Enforcement of a Texas judgment in
another state or in a foreign country, or the enforcement of sister state or
foreign country judgments in Texas, present special problems. Two uni-
form acts adopted by the 67th Texas Legislature address these special
problems.
A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel' 58
Supreme Court Cases. Willie McCurry was charged by Missouri authori-
ties with possession of heroin and assault with intent to kill. Prior to his
criminal trial, McCurry invoked the fourth and fourteenth amendments in
an unsuccessful attempt to suppress evidence that had been seized by the
police. His subsequent conviction was affirmed by a state appellate
court.'5 9 He then sought redress for the alleged constitutional violation in
a federal court in a civil rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.160
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether "the unavail-
ability of federal habeas corpus [under Stone v. Powell' 611 prevented the
police officers from raising the state courts' partial rejection of McCurry's
constitutional claim as a collateral estoppel defense to the section 1983 suit
157. For other recent developments, see Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 333, 353-57 (1981); Newton, supra note 105, at 411-13.
158. The term res judicata in its broadest sense is sometimes said to include the doctrine
of collateral estoppel, but the two terms carry two distinct although related meanings.
Under res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior action precludes a suit between the
same parties or their privies on the same claim. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation in
a subsequent action upon a different claim of issues actually and necessarily determined in
the prior action. For a discussion of this general area in light of the adoption of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1979), see Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 510 (1981).
159. State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. Ap. 1979).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). Section 1983 authorizes a civil cause of action
against any person for the deprivation of any constitutional or statutory right, privilege, or
immunity.
161. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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against them for damages."' 62
The majority opinion in Allen v. McCurry noted that federal courts tra-
ditionally adhere to the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel because they serve to "relieve the parties of the cost and vexation of
multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsis-
tent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication."' 63 The Court, how-
ever, has staunchly limited preclusion under these doctrines to cases
involving a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate in the earlier case. Thus,
the Court stated that in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to state
court decisions, federal courts must give effect to the underlying rationale
and "promote the comity between state and federal courts that has been
recognized as a bulwark of the federal system."' 6
4
Since the specific question before the Court was whether or not a section
1983 action may be precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the
issue was primarily one of statutory interpretation. Because of the paucity
of direct legislative history of the statute, however, with respect to this is-
sue, the arguments and conclusions set forth by the Court are clearly ex-
pressions of how compatible the Court found the underlying rationales of
collateral estoppel and section 1983 actions. 65 The majority found that
the underlying rationales were compatible, and held that collateral estop-
pel could preclude a section 1983 suit.1 66 In so doing, the Court consid-
ered a number of factors: the views of other courts; the effect of the demise
of the doctrine of mutuality; the legislative history of section 1983 in con-
text and in practice; and, finally, the effect of the Court's holding in Stone
V. Powell.1
67
A significant case discussed in Allen is Preiser v. Rodriquez, in which the
Supreme Court implicitly approved the application by lower federal courts
of the preclusion doctrine to statutory civil rights suits. 168 The lack of au-
thority other than Preiser, however, weakens the basis for the Allen hold-
ing. Because the requirement of mutuality of estoppel was accepted at the
time of passage of section 1983, the drafters of the legislation may have
assumed that preclusion, especially of the sort contemplated in Preiser,
would not apply. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that there is no bar to
reaching a result which would not have been possible under the act when
passed.' 69 Such a conclusion clearly is unsupportable unless the legislative
162. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 91 (1980).
163. Id. at 94.
164. Id. at 95-96 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1970)). The Court further
noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) mandates preclusive effect for state court judgments
whenever that effect would apply within the state. 449 U.S. at 96.
165. It is unclear whether under the facts collateral estoppel is completely preclusive.
According to the majority, that issue was not before the Court. 449 U.S. at 93 n.2.
166. Id. at 104, 105.
167. Id. at 96-105.
168. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). The Court noted that since Preiser, "the virtually unanimous
view of the Courts of Appeals. . . has been that § 1983 presents no categorical bar to the
application of res judicata and collarteral estoppel concepts." 449 U.S. at 97.
169. 449 U.S. at 97-98.
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history of section 1983 definitely leads to the same result.
The Court conceded that congressional debates showed that a major
motive behind the enactment of section 1983 was a concern that state
courts had been deficient in protecting federal rights. 170 The Court stated,
however, that federal jurisdiction is supplementary and thus available only
when "state substantive law [is] facially unconstitutional, where state pro-
cedural law [is] inadequate to allow full litigation of a constitutional claim,
and where state procedural law, though adequate in theory, [is] inadequate
in practice." 171 In short, because collateral estoppel applies only when
there is a full and fair opportunity to litigate, there is no reason to believe
that "Congress intended to allow relitigation of federal issues decided after
a full and fair hearing in a state court simply because the state court's
decision may have been erroneous."'1
72
Finally, the Court turned to the question of whether its holding in Stone
v. Powell' 73 might justify a refusal to apply the rule of preclusion to cases
which were originally brought as criminal cases in state courts. In Stone
the Court held that federal habeas corpus relief is not available under an
allegation of a fourth amendment violation when a party has had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claim in a state court.
174
According to the Court, Stone did not concern section 1983 actions or the
preclusive effect of state court judgments; rather, the Stone opinion merely
considered the "prudent exercise" of federal court jurisdiction under the
habeas corpus statute. 175 Thus, the Court rejected the argument that every
person asserting a federal right is entitled to an unencumbered opportunity
to litigate in a federal district court, regardless of whether the federal claim
first arose in a state court.176
This last argument, that section 1983 guarantees an unencumbered op-
portunity to litigate a civil rights action in a federal court even if it first
arose in a state criminal court, is precisely the one which the dissent in
Allen found to be a proper interpretation of Congressional intent. 177 The
dissent cited both legislative history and subsequent judicial interpretation
of that history in the cases of Monroe v. Pape17 8 and Mitchum v. Foster
17 9
for support.18 0 Furthermore, even though it argued mainly that legislative
intent ought to control, th,! dissent concluded by asserting that a "criminal
defendant is an involuntary litigant in the state tribunal, and against him
all the forces of the State are arrayed. To force him to a choice between
forgoing either a potential defense or a federal forum for hearing his con-
170. Id. at 98.
171. Id. (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
172. Id. at 101.
173. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
174. Id. at 494.
175. 449 U.S. at 103. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
176. 449 U.S. at 103-04.
177. Mr. Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
178. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
179. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
180. 449 U.S. at 110-12.
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stitutional civil claim is fundamentally unfair."' 8'
What is the likely impact of the Allen decision? Obviously the applica-
tion of rules of preclusion limits the availability of section 1983 actions. In
addition, it may be difficult in practice to convince the Supreme Court or
any other federal court that a criminal defendant did not have a full and
fair opportunity to litigate a claim. Nevertheless, upon a showing of
facially unconstitutional state substantive law, state procedural law inade-
quate to allow full litigation of a constitutional claim, or state procedural
law inadequate in practice, preclusion will not be invoked.
An expanded use of rules of preclusion was also at issue in the case of
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie. 8 2 Certiorari was granted to
decide whether the Ninth Circuit had validly created an exception to the
doctrine of res judicata.' s3 The United States initially filed an antitrust
suit against Federated Department Stores, alleging that they had agreed to
fix the retail price of women's clothing sold in northern California in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 84 Thereafter, private plaintiffs filed
seven parallel civil actions seeking treble damages on behalf of classes of
retail purchasers under state law. These suits were filed in both a state
court and a federal court. The state court action subsequently was re-
moved to federal court.'8 5 All of the actions were then dismissed for fail-
ure to allege an injury to plaintiffs business or property under the Clayton
Act.' 86 Five of the plaintiffs appealed directly from that judgment to the
court of appeals. Two of the plaintiffs, however, Moitie (who had original-
ly filed in state court) and Brown (who had originally filed in federal court)
refiled in state court instead of appealing. Federated removed these new
suits to federal court, where the district court dismissed the actions as be-
ing precluded by the judgments in the first suit. '8 7 Plaintiffs appealed this
decision to the Ninth Circuit. While this appeal and the direct appeal
from the original dismissal instituted by the other five of the original plain-
tiffs were pending, the Supreme Court decided Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. 188
In Reiter the Court held that retail purchasers can suffer an injury to their
property under the Clayton Act.' 8 9 In light of that holding, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded the five original plaintiff's cases which had
been directly appealed. 90 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit reversed the res
judicata holding in the new Moitie and Brown suits. 191 The court of ap-
peals reasoned that the doctrine of res judicata should yield to "overriding
181. Id. at 116.
182. 101 S. Ct. 2424, 69 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1981).
183. Id. at 2426, 69 L. Ed. at 107.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
185. The state court case by Marilyn Moitie was removed on the basis of diversity of
citizenship and federal question jurisdiction.
186. Weinburg v. Federated Dep't Stores, 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
187. 101 S. Ct. at 2426, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 108.
188. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
189. Id. at 342.
190. Moitie v. Federated Dep't Stores, 611 F.2d 1267, 1268 (9th Cir. 1980).
191. Id. at 1269-70.
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concerns of public policy and simple justice."' 192 Thus, where an underly-
ing case is successfully appealed, the issues are kept alive; where the origi-
nal dismissal was based on a case that had beenfloverruled, then "justice
requires that the dismissal of the non-appealing parties' suits be re-
versed."' 193 The defendant appealed the reversal to the Supreme Court.
The majority opinion in Moitie is characterized by its emphasis on the
finality rationale for res judicata.194 In affirming the trial court's decision
to dismiss, the Court stated that once a final judgment on the merits is
rendered, it precludes relitigation of any issues that were raised or that
could have been raised, whether or not the judgment was based on an
erroneous conclusion or an erroneous determination of fact or law. 195 Be-
cause collateral attack on an erroneous decision is precluded, reversal of a
legal principle offers no basis for an equitable exception to finality. 196 Nor
did the majority consider that there was any basis for an exception based
on "simple justice." The Court reasoned that simple justice is to be viewed
from the standpoint of the system as a whole, not from the standpoint of a
particular case because, by definition, the doctrine of res judicata serves
vital public interests that outweigh determinations of the equities in an
individual suit. 197 The Court stated: "There is simply 'no principle of law
or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary
principle of res judicata.' ,9s The Court continued that public policy
must likewise be considered from the vantage point of the system as a
whole: that policy favors an end to litigation, and must not be treated as
one of practice or procedure, but rather as a rule of fundamental and sub-
stantial justice which is "even more compelling in view of today's crowded
dockets."' 99
Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Mr. Justice Marshall, concurred in the
judgment but felt that it was improper to "close the door upon the possibil-
ity that there are cases in which the doctrine of res judicata must give way
to what the Court of Appeals referred to as 'overriding concerns of public
policy and simple justice.' "200 One case cited with approval in the concur-
192. Id at 1269.
193. Id. at 1270.
194. The Court noted: Two important policies conflict in this area. On the one hand it is
important that court decisions be 'correct' in law. On the other hand it is important that
there be a termination point to litigation. 101 S. Ct. at 2429, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 110.
195. Id. at 2427, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 108.
196. Id. at 2428 n.4, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 109. The Court found that the decision of the Ninth
Circuit was contrary to its prior decisions. Id. at 2429, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 109. Of particular
importance is the case of Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932), which rigorously applied the
res judicata doctrine. The Court stated that Reed negated the existence of any general equi-
table doctrine supporting exceptions to the finality basis for res judicata. 101 S. Ct. at 2428-
29, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 109-10. Moreover, the majority viewed the facts in Moitie as presenting
compelling reasons to apply the doctrine of res judicata because the respondents deliberately
chose not to pursue an appeal and then sought to gain from the "reversal procured by other
independent parties." Id. at 2429, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 110.
197. 101 S. Ct. at 2429, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 110.
198. Id. (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946)).
199. Id., 69 L. Ed. 2d at 111.
200. Id. at 2430, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 111.
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ring opinion is Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Uresti,20 a decision by the Waco
court of civil appeals. In that case Ford Motor Credit Company sued
Uresti and Hernandez, alleging that Uresti had purchased a tractor on
credit and had fallen into arrears on his installment contract and also al-
leging that Uresti had then transferred the tractor to Hernandez. Ford
sought foreclosure of the lien on the tractor and judgment for possession of
the tractor. Uresti answered by charging that the retail installment con-
tract violated the Federal Truth in Lending Act 20 2 and the Texas Con-
sumer Credit Code.20 3 Hernandez also asserted violations of the federal
and state acts, and in addition, cross-claimed for the money which he paid
Uresti for the tractor. Judgment was rendered for Ford against Uresti, but
was offset by a judgment for Uresti for $1,000 for violation of the Truth in
Lending Act.2°4 Hernandez was awarded the tractor outright.20 5 Ford ap-
pealed the judgment as to Hernandez, but not as to Uresti. The Waco
court of civil appeals in reversing the judgment as to both defendants,
noted that a decision to reverse would require a reversal as to Uresti as
well as to Hernandez, because otherwise Hernandez would have no right
to assert his cross-claim against Uresti.20 6 In this case an equitable excep-
tion to res judicata would be permitted.
The main issue in the Moitie case concerned the desire to provide liti-
gants with a fair determination and to provide finality. The majority
might agree to certain exceptions under what it labeled in Allen v. Mc-
Curry as the existing general limitations on rules of preclusion. The gen-
eral rules do not apply where the party against whom an earlier court
decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
claim or issue. Yet the language of the majority seems clear-finality is
such an important consideration that the starting point is always the sys-
tem as a whole and not the individual litigant. Under this approach the
finality consideration is almost always decisive. Ironically, a possible re-
sult of this rule will be to increase the number of appeals since a failure to
appeal will clearly subject the losing party to rules of preclusion.
Texas Cases. A clear understanding of the relative importance of the pol-
icy of finality has become extremely important in divorce cases where one
party is entitled to federal retirement benefits. In Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo,207 the United States Supreme Court held that Railroad Retire-
ment Act benefits are not divisible as community property in a state court.
This rule was made applicable to military retirement benefits in McCarty v.
201. 581 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
202. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691f (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
203. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, §§ 1.01-3.21 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
204. 581 S.W.2d at 299.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 300. In support of this general proposition the court cited Lockhart v. A.W.
Snyder & Co., 163 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1942) and Bates v. First Nat'l Bank, 502 S.W.2d 181
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ).
207. 439 U.S. 572 (1979); see Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979).
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McCarty.20 8 Texas courts hearing disputes over federal benefits are now
forced to examine two important and conflicting policies: the policy of
finality (enforcing termination of litigation after an opportunity for full
and fair litigation) and the policy of validity (insuring that judgments are
rendered only by courts having the power to do so). 20 9 Hisquierdo and
McCarty may well be wrong and may cause great hardship in Texas. 210
To the extent this is true, the question becomes one of relief. Can the
courts grant reief? Will the courts grant relief? Must there be legislative
action? It may be that there is ". . . no method to secure the repeal of bad
or obnoxious laws so effective as their stringent execution, ' 21 1 but courts
are also tempted to repeal "obnoxious" rules.
Two problems that have arisen regarding division of military benefits
are the effect to be given to McCarty in the attempted partition of military
benefits not awarded in a past final divorce decree and the effect to be
given to an attempted partition of military benefits awarded in a past final
divorce decree. Trahan v. Trahan,212 decided by the Texas Supreme Court
on November 18, 1981, addressed the question of whether the Supremacy
Clause213 of the United States Constitution preempts a partition by a state
court of military retirement benefits not divided in a prior final divorce
decree. Prior to McCarty the law in Texas was well established that mili-
tary retirement benefits earned during marriage were divisible upon di-
vorce. 214 Moreover, if no division was made upon divorce, a subsequent
suit for partition was possible.215 The court held that in any case where
final judgment had not been reached before June 26, 1981, the date of the
McCarty decision, a division of military retirement benefits through appli-
cation of Texas community property laws would be preempted.216 It
makes no difference that a final draft decree existed and that all that was
being sought was a partition of property, which under the law at the time
of the rendition of the decree was "community." 21 7 The court concluded:
"No final adjudication regarding . . . military retirement benefits has or
208. 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981).
209. For a general discussion of the tension between the goals of finality and validity, see
Hazard,Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1041-44 (1971). By implication
of Hisquierdo, division problems may also exist with respect to social security benefits. See
Reppy, Learning to Live with Hisquierdo, 6 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 5 (1979). The division of
civil service benefits does not seem to be affected. 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
210. See Kornfeld, Commentary.- Supreme Court Majoriy Shoots Down Community
Pro erty Division of Military Retired Pay, 8 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 87 (1981).
211. President U.S. Grant, Inaugural Address, March 4, 1869. For articles generally
dealing with the problems raised by McCarty see Kahn, McCarty v. McCarty, TRIAL LAW.
F., July-Sept. 1981, at 12; Kahn, McCarty Revisited, TRIAL LAW. F., Apr.-June 1982, at 11;
McKnight, Dealing with Reimbursement and Federal Retirement Benefits on Divorce, TRIAL
LAW F., Jan.-March 1982, at 13.
212. 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981).
213. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
214. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661
(Tex. 1976).
215. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
216. 626 S.W.2d at 487-88.
217. Id.
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will be made until this Court renders its opinion (in the appeal of this
partition case). In the absence of a final adjudication, the doctrine of res
judicata is inapplicable." 21P
In reaching this conclusion the court recognized that McCarty held that
military retirement benefits are simply not subject to division upon divorce
pursuant to the laws of a state. McCarty's reasoning was that Congress
enacted the military retirement system specifically for the military and that
application of community property principles to that system gravely
threatened it and its goals. Under the Supremacy Clause Texas courts are
required to reverse the previous rule that military retirement benefits
earned during marriage constitute community property.
After reaching this conclusion the court then distinguished the Trahan
fact situation, a direct appeal from a judgment dividing previously undi-
vided retirement benefits, from the fact situation in the Fifth Circuit case
of Erspan v. Badgett,219 which was an appeal from a judgment enforcing a
decree that divided retirement benefits and became final before McCarty
was decided. Erspan raised the second major question-what effect is to
be given to a partition of military benefits awarded in a past final divorce
decree. 220 Badgett and Erspan obtained a divorce in El Paso in 1963. Part
of the divorce decree declared army benefits to be community property
and ordered Badgett to maintain with the army an allotment order provid-
ing for the payment directly to plaintiff of one-half of all future payments.
After maintaining this allotment pursuant to the decree from 1963 to 1967,
Badgett discontinued payment and had made no payments since that date.
Erspan sued in federal court seeking her share of the retirement benefits
paid by the government but not forwarded to her in the past.221 In addi-
tion, she sought an order ensuring receipt of future benefits. The court
ordered payment of past accrued benefits and ordered the execution of an
allotment order.222 After affirmance by the Fifth Circuit,223 Badgett
sought a rehearing, alleging that the order made by the district court was
precluded by the holding in Hisquierdo and McCarty. In a per curiam
opinion the Fifth Circuit rejected Badgett's argument. 224
Central to the opinion of the Fifth Circuit denying rehearing was the
fact that Hisquierdo and McCarty were direct appeals.225 The Fifth Cir-
cuit was persuaded that the judgment was entitled to its usual res judicata
218. Id. at 488. See also Jeffrey v. Kendrick, 621 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1981, no writ); Powell v. Powell, 620 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
219. 659 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1981).
220. By implication the Texas Supreme Court agreed with Erspan's application of res
judicata to preclude retroactive application of McCarty.
221. In 1971 Erspan obtained a judgment for benefits due. That judgment was affirmed
on appeal in Badgett v. Erspan, 476 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, no writ).
222. See Erspan v. Badgett, 647 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 1981).
223. Id. at 556.
224. 659 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1981).
225. Id. at 28.
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effect. 226 Citing as authority Moitie, the opinion stated that a final judg-
ment settles not only issues actually litigated but also any issues that could
have been litigated. 227 Further, the effect of res judicata is not altered by
the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or premised on a legal
principle subsequently overruled in another case.
228
The San Antonio court of appeals faced essentially the same question
but reached an opposite result in the case of Ex Parte Buckhanan.229 Real-
tor Buckhanan sought relief through a habeas corpus proceeding after hav-
ing been held in contempt for failing to obey a final divorce decree
rendered in 1977. Pursuant to that decree, Buckhanan was to pay his for-
mer wife a part of his military retirement pay, an obligation he did not
fulfill. His former spouse initiated contempt proceedings resulting in the
issuance of a contempt citation and an order of confinement, thus directly
raising the question of the effect of McCarty on the application of res judi-
cata to a past divorce decree awarding military retirement benefits.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Erspan, the San Antonio court of appeals
acknowledged the difference between a validity problem and a problem
involving a mistake of law or fact.230 Relator's application for a writ of
habeas corpus was recognized as a collateral attack on a final judgment.
Consequently, the court ruled that such an attack is not possible unless the
district court lacked the power to make an award of military retirement
pay. 231 Because Texas follows the general rule of res judicata that a final
judgment which is only erroneous cannot be collaterally attacked, 232 the
controlling question in this case was "whether applicable federal law,
through the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, pre-
empted the power of Texas courts to treat the relator's military re-
tire(ment) pay as community property .... ,,233 The court, in reversing
the order of the lower court, concluded that because the payments are not
subject to division upon divorce as property under federal law a contempt
order for nonpayment is unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause.
234
A decision such as McCarty raises a conflict between two important pol-
icies: validity and finality of judgments. In fact, the tension between the
two is one of the major concerns dealt with under the res judicata doctrine.
Initially the policy of validity was emphasized more heavily than the pol-




229. 626 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
230. Id. at 65.
231. Id.
232. Id. (citing Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fisher, 152 Tex. 29, 253 S.W.2d 656 (1953) and
Clayton v. Hurt, 88 Tex. 595, 32 S.W. 876 (1895).
233. Id.; see Exparte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1979), in which the Texas Supreme
Court refused to enforce a contempt order for federal benefits that were "solely" for the use
of the relator. Relying on Hisquierdo, the court held that the contempt order was preempted
by the Supremacy Clause. 591 S.W.2d at 456. See also Exparte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192
(Tex. 1981).
234. 626 S.W.2d at 68.
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subject matter jurisdiction were void.235 Courts in the United States
adopted this doctrine.236 As explained in a recent law review article:
[T]he traditional theory has a logical but simplistic appeal. Both fed-
eral and state courts are limited m their subject matter jurisdiction by
constitutions and legislation. Courts that act beyond those constraints
act without power; judgments of courts lacking subject matter juris-
diction are void-not deserving of respect by other judicial bodies or
by the litigants. This is so even if the litigants want the court to exer-
cise jurisdiction; parties cannot confer power upon a court if the legis-
lature or constitution has denied it power. Thus the parties could
collaterally attack a judgment at any time.237
By the 1800's courts in the United States began to carve out exceptions to
the validity oriented traditional voidness doctrine. By the early 1930's the
Supreme Court adopted a rule which did more than simply carve out an
exception to the traditional voidness doctrine-it held that finality interest
could outweigh validity.238
By the late 1930's the Supreme Court announced that a determination of
subject matter jurisdiction by a court of general jurisdiction in a contested
action was res judicata.239 While there remained some ambiguity,240 the
position of the Supreme Court seemed clear-instead of validity interests
occassionally curtailed by finality interests the rule now favored finality
interests occasionally curtailed by validity interests.24' All that remained
was to determine the exceptions to the new general rule of res judicata.
Case law, as reflected in the First and Second Restatements of Judgments,
provided the answer.
Kalb v. Feuerstein,242 decided by the Supreme Court in 1940, employed
language which recalled the traditional rule. But the real issue in Kalb
was whether a state court could render judgment during the pendency of a
petition filed in a federal bankruptcy court. Federal bankruptcy law re-
sults from an explicit exercise by Congress of its exclusive and plenary
power under the constitution to regulate bankruptcy.243 The rule of Kalb
is that once Congress has assured exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter (bankruptcy) state court jurisdiction is preempted and any judg-
ment by a state court purporting to exercise jurisdiction in the preempted
area is a nullity subject to collateral attack.
235. See, e.g., Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612). See gener-
ally Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L. REV. 49 (1961).
236. Dobbs, supra note 235, at 77-78.
237. Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534, 537 (1981). See also Note, Filling the
Void- Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164 (1977).
238. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assoc., 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
239. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
240. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939).
241. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 101 S. Ct. 2424, 69 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1981);
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
242. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
243. Frazier-Lemke Act, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49 Stat. 942 (1935).
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United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ,244 decided by the
Supreme Court in the same year as Kalb, further illustrates the nature of
the validity exception to the finality rule. In that case the court refused to
foreclose a collateral attack against a judgment of a federal court awarding
damages against the United States because the claim was not raised in the
courts specified by Congress. What is clear from the discussion of the ra-
tionale for the conclusion is that finality cannot be used to foreclose or
vitiate determination properly attributed within the scheme of our govern-
ment to some other body, in this case Congress. Where "extrinsic policies
implicating the powers or policies of other branches of government" 245 are
involved, finality interests may properly yield.
A judgment was void if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter according to the first Restatement of Judgments.2 46 But
there might be an exception. If a court with jurisdiction over the parties
had determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction then a court review-
ing a collateral attack was to use a balancing test which weighted the final-
ity policy against the validity policy.247 In the 1963 case of Durfee v.
Duke248 the Supreme Court referred to the Restatement, Kalb and Fidelity
and said "the general rule of finality of jurisdictional determinations is not
without exceptions. Doctrines of federal preemption or sovereign immu-
nity may in some contexts be controlling. '249 The Restatement (Second)
provides that in cases in which the proceeding was contested but the
question of subject matter jurisdiction was not raised, 250 whether the judg-
ment is entitled to finality depends on a balancing of (1) any justifiable
interest of reliance that must be protected,25 1 and (2) the extent to which
giving effect to the judgment would substantially infringe the authority of
another tribunal or agency of government. 252 This formulation is one
which gives reasonable guidance without inflexibly attempting to defini-
tively characterize each and every situation. Application of this formula
supports the conclusion of the majority in Ex Parte Buckhanan, supplies
further rationale for Texas Supreme Court cases like Ex Parte Johnson253
and Ex Parte Burson ,254 and allows for answers to certain problems which
have not yet come before the courts directly.
244. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
245. See Moore, supra note 237, at 562.
246. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 7 (1942).
247. Id. § 10. The five facts that favored validity were (1) clarity of lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, (2) whether the jursidictional issue hinged on a question of law or fact,
(3) whether the rendering court was one of limited or general jurisdiction, (4) whether the
jurisdictional issue was litigated, and (5) the strength of the policy against permitting the
court to exceed its subject matter jurisdiction.
248. 375 U.S. 106 (1963). The Court actually quoted the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 451(2) (Supp. 1948), which adopted the RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942).
249. 375 U.S. at 114.
250. These are cases in which the parties assumed the court had authority.
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 117 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1979).
252. Id., § 15.
253. 591 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1979).
254. 615 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1981).
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Justifiable interests of reliance that must be protected are involved in
prospective enforcement of final divorce decrees since such a decree cre-
ates a justifiable interest of reliance. That interest is one based on the fair-
ness of the division, the law as it was at the time in question, and a final
judgment. Each aspect of the justifiable interest of reliance is illustrated in
the following hypothetical. The husband, about to retire from the service,
asks for and receives the house in the city, the cars, the bank accounts and
his personalty because he wants to remain in the city after retirement and
begin a second career. The wife, anxious to leave the city, settles for 100%
of her husband's soon-to-be awarded retirement benefits. She uses all of
her separate property to make a downpayment on a farm with future pay-
ments to be made with the monthly retirement benefits. The divorce is
granted, the husband retires and retirement payments commence. Now
the husband ceases to pay. The wife has lost her portion of the community
property, the awarded military retirement benefits and may well lose all of
her separate property as well if she is unable to meet payments as they
come due.
This type of justifiable interest of reliance is compelling. But it must be
balanced against the extent to which giving effect to the past judgment
would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of
government. If the military retirement is a federally preempted personal
entitlement (regardless of the propriety of such a characterization) 255 then
any state court action in opposition to the federal interest necessarily in-
fringes on the authority of the federal government.
Thus in a case like Ex Parte Buckhanan256 a balancing must take place.
First, there must be a finding as to the nature of the justifiable interest of
reliance to be protected. Prospective desires for participation in military
retirement benefits are such an interest. 257 Second, there must be a finding
as to whether giving effect to the judgment would substantially infringe the
authority of another agency of government. As the Supreme Court of the
United States,258 the Supreme Court of Texas259 and the San Antonio
court of appeals260 recognize, enforcement by court action after June 26,
1981 in a Texas court of claims against military benefits would substan-
tially infringe federal authority. In McCarty the majority stated:
[W]e agree with Appellant's . . . argument that the application of
255. The question is not whether Congress should make such a determination or even
whether it actually did make such a determination. Rather, the question is whether state
courts can ignore the Supremacy Clause.
256. 626 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ). For purpose of this
discussion, all that is necessary for a case to be similar is that it grow out of a past final
judgment. It does not matter whether the case is an appeal from an attempt to enforce a past
final divorce decree directly or whether it is an appeal by habeas corpus from a contempt
proceeding.
257. A court might well take judicial notice of such reliance.
258. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 102 S. Ct. 49, 70 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1981); McCarty v. McCarty,
101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981).
259. Trahan v. Trahan, 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981); Exparte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192
(Tex. 1981); Exparte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1979).
260. Exparte Buckhanan, 626 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
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community property law conflicts with the federal military retirement
scheme regardless of whether retired pay is defined as current or as
deferred compensation. The statutory language is straight-forward:
"A member of the Army retired under this chapter is entitled to re-
tired pay. . . ." In Hisquierdo. . .we emphasized that under the
Railroad Retirement Act a spouse of a retired railroad worker was
entitled to a separate annuity that terminated upon divorce . . .; in
contrast, the military retirement system confers no entitlement to re-
tired pay upon the retired service member's spouse. Thus, unlike the
Railroad Retirement Act, the military retirement system does not em-
body even a limited "community property concept." Indeed, Con-
gress has explicitly stated: "Historically, military retired pay has been
apersonal entitlement payable to the retired member himself as long
as he lives."'261
This is clear, unequivocal and absolute preemption. Application of this
aspect of the Supremacy Clause weighs the balance conclusively against
application of res judicata.
On the other hand, failure to apply res judicata to prospective enforce-
ment does not mean that res judicata is inapplicable to prevent recoup-
ment of past payments made262 under a proper application of the
Restatement (Second) approach. This is so because as the previous discus-
sion has made clear, the old void/voidness dichotomy of the traditional
rule no longer applies. Rather res judicata applies even in cases involving
subject matter jurisdiction, subject to exceptions. The fact that a request to
a Texas court for enforcement cannot be allowed after June 26, 1981 does
not mean that retired military personnel can now seek to recover for past
payments made under final decrees as to payments already made, since the
Restatement (Second) balancing test upholds finality.
A spouse who has spent money received pursuant to a final judgment
has a justifiable interest of reliance which must be protected. The passage
of time, the reality of the hardship of any requirement of repayment, and
the imponderable impact on public perceptions as to finality and justice if
res judicata were not allowed conclusively establish a justifiable interest of
reliance which must be protected. Allowing res judicata to apply to past
payments does not substantially infringe the authority of another agency
of government. Even though the governmental desire that payments go to
the military members has been thwarted, that "loss" to the government is
past. Its effect, whatever its nature and magnitude, has been successfully
borne. It is a loss which will continue to diminish as time goes by.
Although the effect of McCarty on past final divorce decrees squarely
presents a res judicata issue, some courts have chosen to analyze the issue
under the doctrine of nonretroactive application of judicial decisions.263
261. 101 S. Ct. at 2736-37, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 600-01 (footnote and citations omitted).
262. Judge Klingeman assumes in his dissent in Buckhanan that res judicata either ap-
plies across the board or not at all. 626 S.W.2d at 68.
263. See generally Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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The San Antonio court of appeals in Exparte Rodriquez264 and the Austin
court of appeals in Exparle Gaudion265 do not explain why they chose to
apply the doctrine of nonretroactive application instead of res judicata. By
the terms of the respective doctrines, res judicata appears to be the more
applicable test. The Texas Supreme Court did not even apply the doctrine
of nonretroactive application in Trahan,266 a case where res judicata was
inapplicable but the doctrine of nonretroactive application was clearly ap-
plicable. Perhaps-the nonretroactive doctrine is chosen because it allows
avoidance of the McCarty decision. Under this doctrine the court consid-
ers three separate factors. (1) The decision to be applied nonretroactively
must establish a new principle of law.267 (2) The court must weigh the
merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule
and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.
268
(3) The court must decide whether the inequity imposed by retroactive
application is so harsh as to require avoidance of injustice or hardship by
decreeing that the case shall be nonretroactive.
269
The courts that have applied the nonretroactive doctrine have concluded
that McCarty ought to be nonretroactive. Analysis of the three prongs of
the test provides clear support for this result under the first and third ele-
ments. But the second element raises the same issue previously discussed
under the doctrine of res judicata: to what extent is McCarty a case pre-
empting state action? To the extent that McCarty is a preemption case,
retrospective operation is mandated. McCarty by its own terms is a pre-
emption case.270
Since McCarty the United States Supreme Court has again considered a
case involving an interpretation of an act of Congress which resulted in
certain inequities. In Ridgway v. Ridgway271 the question was one of com-
peting claims to a Servicemen's Group Life Insurance policy. The service-
man was divorced and the divorce decree ordered him to keep policies in
force for the benefit of the couple's three children. Later the serviceman
remarried and immediately changed the beneficiary designation to his sec-
ond wife. When the serviceman died there was a contest over the proceeds
of the policy. While recognizing that the result was "unpalatable," the
Supreme Court nonetheless unwaiveringly held that federal law preempts
264. No. C-911 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981). The Texas Supreme Court subse-
quently denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 110 (Dec. 31, 1981).
265. 628 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982). The Texas Supreme Court denied a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in this case as well. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 170 (Feb. 10, 1982).
See also Mattern v. Mattern, 624 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Ct. App.-Forth Worth 1981, no writ);
Anthony v. Anthony, 624 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
266. 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981).
267. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (citing Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) and Hanover Shoe v. United States Shoe Machinery Corp.
392 U.S. 481 (1968).
268. 404 U.S. at 106-07 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1975)).
269. 404 U.S. at 107 (citing Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)).
270. See text accompanying note 261 supra.





While the decisions of the Supreme Court are clear, the equities served
by ignoring res judicata's proper application or misapplying the doctrine
of nonretroactive application are appealing. Until a final United States
Supreme Court determination forecloses avoidance of McCarty, creative
decisions can be expected to flourish.273
B. New Texas Uniform Judgment Acts
Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act. Traditionally,
unnecessary post-litigation problems existed both for Texans who obtained
money judgments against foreigners and for Texans who successfully de-
fended against money judgments in foreign states. For example, assume
that Slater, a United States citizen domiciled in Texas, enters into a con-
tract for the sale of a computer in Laredo with Segundo, a Mexican citizen.
Segundo changes his mind after signing a legal and binding contract and
refuses to carry out the contract. Slater sues in a court in Texas and ob-
tains a valid final judgment. Although Segundo has no assets in Texas, he
has more than enough assets to satisfy the Texas judgment in Mexico.
Slater, therefore, seeks to have his Texas judgment recognized in Mexico.
Any enforcement of one nation's judgments in another nation is governed
by the general doctrine of comity. In Mexico, as in most nations, comity
requires reciprocity.27 4 Thus, the Texas judgment will be enforced in
Mexico to the same extent that a valid Mexican judgment will be enforced
in Texas. The issue then becomes whether a Texas court would enforce a
valid Mexican judgment. Pertinent Texas cases arguably support a finding
of reciprocity. 275 But the cases are both equivocal and as legal authority
an anathema to civil law courts. It is thus understandable that civil law
nations would refuse to recognize reciprocity established or proven only by
case law.27 6 If the highest court in a jurisdiction were to certify the exist-
ence of a rule of reciprocity or if there were a statute establishing reciproc-
ity, then a civil law country would undoubtedly recognize reciprocity.
Absent certification or a statute, Slater would be unlikely to prevail in
Mexico.
What if the operative facts were reversed? Assume that Slater went to
Mexico and there entered into negotiations with Segundo for the purchase
272. Id. at 59, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 53.
273. Cases from other jurisdictions that agree with the result reached in Erspan, Rodri-
quez, and Gaudion include Erbe v. Eady, 406 So. 2d 936 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Fellers v.
Fellers, 125 Cal. App. 3d 254, 178 Cal. Rptr. 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Sheldon v. Sheldon,
124 Cal. App. 3d 377, 177 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), Mahone v. Mahone, 123 Cal.
App. 3d 17, 176 Cal. Rptr. 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
274. With the exception of previous members of the British Commonwealth and commu-
nist nations, most nations have civil law as opposed to common law legal systems. The
general rule of comity in civil law systems requires reciprocity. See Carl, Recognition of
Texas Judgments in Courts of Foreign Nations--and Vice Versa, 13 Hous. L. REv. 680, 686
(1976).
275. Id. at 681-86.
276. Id. at 686.
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of a computer. Although no agreement could be reached as to price,
Segundo sues Slater in a Mexican court alleging that a contract did exist.
Slater prevails and a judgment on the merits is rendered. Relieved, Slater
returns to Laredo. What if Segundo follows Slater to Laredo and files the
same suit in a Texas district court? Will Slater be able to assert his Mexi-
can judgment as a bar to the Texas suit? Probably, but the answer is not
guaranteed. 277
Clearly when the granting or denying of a money judgment depends
upon comity between common law and civil law nations, a governing stat-
ute will be most helpful. A statutory basis for comity has been provided
through the 67th Texas Legislature's adoption of the Uniform Foreign
Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act (the Money Act or the Act). 278
This statute applies to judgments granting or denying a sum of money, 279
but does not include tax judgments, fines, penalties, or familial support
judgments rendered by a governmental unit outside of the United States
system. 280 Such a final money judgment is to be enforced in the same
manner as the judgment rendered in another state in the United States and
is entitled to full faith and credit.28'
Two major concerns exist in any determination of the comity to be given
to a foreign country judgment: whether there was personal jurisdiction,
and whether the process of judgment rendition was fair.2 8 2 The Act deals
with questions of jurisdiction by including provisions for voluntary ap-
pearance, voluntary agreement, domicile, specifically-affiliating commer-
cial presence, operation of a motor vehicle or airplane, and such other
bases as the court might recognize.283 It also provides that recognition
shall not be refused if the defendant was served personally in the foreign
country.2 84
Detailed safeguards against forced recognition of "unfair" judgments do
exist in the Money Act. The major grounds for nonrecognition involve
277. Id. at 684-86.
278. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b--6 (Vernon Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Money Act). The Act was part of the State Bar's legislative program. Professor Beverly Carl
of SMU, who has written extensively on this subject served as vice-chairman of the State
Bar's International Law Section during the Bar sponsorship and subsequent legislative
adoption of the Act. Professor Carl initially suggested that the word money be added to the
title of the Act. See generally Carl, supra note 274. As of 1980 the Act has been adopted in
nineteen states other than Texas. They are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
279. Money Act, supra note 278, §§ 2(2), 4.
280. Id. § 2(2).
281. Id.§4.
282. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
283. Money Act, supra note 278, § 6.
284. Id. § 6(a)(1). Under the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), this result
is acceptable. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jursidiction: The Power'
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956). This basis is highly questionable
under current Supreme Court decisions, however, because in some cases an exercise of juris-
diction based only on personal service in a foreign country might fail under due process
requirements. See Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 333,
333-39 (1981); Money Act, supra note 278, § 5(a)(l).
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tribunals or procedures incompatible with due process of law or a failure
of subject matter jurisdiction.285 In addition, recognition need not be
given where there is insufficient notice, the judgment was obtained by
fraud, the judgment is repugnant to Texas public policy, the judgment con-
flicts with another final judgment, the judgment ignores an agreed disposi-
tion, the judgment is one involving only personal service and the rendering
court was a seriously inconvenient forum, or the rendering state would not
recognize Texas judgments.286
Of the remaining miscellaneous provisions, two merit special notice.
Under section 8 of the Act, a Texan may recognize a foreign country judg-
ment in situations not covered by the Act. 287 Comity is not and should not
be static. It is appropriate, therefore, that the Act invite its continued gen-
eral growth and application. Under section 10, the provisions of the Act
apply only prospectively. 288 Judgments rendered before June 17, 1981, the
effective date of the Act, are not covered.
C. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
Pursuant to the United States Constitution, state court judgments are
entitled to full faith and credit. 289 The usual practice is to require an ac-
tion based on the foreign judgment which entails the application of full
procedural requirements. In an attempt to eliminate such unnecessary full
procedural proceedings the 67th Texas Legislature adapted the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (the Judgments Act). 290
Any judgment entitled to full faith and credit is covered by the Act. 291
Such a judgment, authenticated either under a federal or Texas statute,292
is filed with the clerk of any Texas court of competent jurisdiction. Once
filed this judgment "has the same effect and is subject to the same proce-
dures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforc-
ing, or satisfying as a judgment of the court in which it is filed."'293 In
addition to filing an authenticated judgment, the judgment creditor must
pay a $10 filing fee, 2 94 and by affidavit show: (1) the name and last known
post office address of the judgment debtor; (2) the name and last known
post office address of the judgment creditor; and (3) if the judgment credi-
tor has any attorney in Texas, the attorney's name and address. Upon
receipt of this information, in proper form, the clerk shall "promptly" mail
notice to the judgment debtor and note the mailing in the docket. 295 Of
285. Money Act, supra note 278, § 5.
286. Id.
287. Id. § 8.
288. Id. § 10.
289. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
290. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5 (Vernon Sup. 1982).
291. Id. § 1.
292. Id. § 2.
293. Id.
294. Id. § 5. Section 5 further provides "fees for other enforcement proceedings shall be
as otherwise provided by law for judgments of the courts of this state. Id.
295. Id. § 3(b).
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course it is possible that some clerks in some courts might not "promptly"
mail the required notice. The Act, therefore, provides that a judgment
creditor may mail notice to the judgment debtor and file proof with the
clerk. 296 If the judgment creditor mails notice and files proof, then any
lack of mailing of notice by the clerk has no effect on the enforcement
proceedings.
After notice has been filed according to either of the two permissible
methods, the judgment becomes enforceable pursuant to the law of Texas.
A showing under Texas law made to the court by a judgment debtor of any
ground staying the enforcement will be effective. 297 Furthermore the
Texas court will stay enforcement 298 upon a showing by the judgment
debtor that an appeal of the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken,
or that a stay has been properly granted.
The commissioner's prefatory note correctly describes the Uniform En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments Act as providing for a summary proceed-
ing. This summary proceeding achieves a laudable goal-it makes a
foreign judgment a Texas judgment. This reduces a great deal of the time
and effort which would be required under the usual procedure. As section
6 makes clear, however, the new procedure is not mandatory and does not
replace the current Texas procedure.
296. Id.
297. The judgment debtor must provide security pursuant to Texas law, Id. § 4.
298. Id.
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